Infrastructure market in Cuba

Cuba is Canada’s main trading partner in the Caribbean. In 2024, bilateral trade in goods between both countries amounted to CAD 910 million, with Canada exporting CAD 278 million and importing CAD 632 million. Despite Cuba’s ongoing economic crisis and cash constraints, total exports from Canada averaged CAD 282 million per year between 2020 and 2024.

In 2024, Canadian exports mainly for construction and maintenance infrastructure works reached a combined value of CAD $28.5 million. These revenues resulted from a relatively diversified scope of items ranging from steel, aluminium structures and vehicles to electrical items, vehicle parts, pipes, screws and nuts. 

• Canadian merchandise exports to Cuba (2024): CAD 278 million
• Canadian combined exports for infrastructure construction and maintenance works (2024) : CAD 28.5 million
  • Iron and steel structures, pipes, containers, screws, bolt, nuts, and nails: CAD  9.3 million
  • Trucks, works vehicles, passenger vehicles and parts: CAD 6.5 million
  • Electrical items for conventional and renewable energy systems: CAD 6.4 million
  • Aluminium structures, sheets, wires, and pipes: CAD 4.8 million
  • Construction inputs made of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos and similar materials: CAD 1.5 million 

Over six decades of underinvestment have created a significant infrastructure deficit. Cuba’s construction sector expanded by an average of 1.5% per year from 2020 to 2024, but these figures are misleading. Construction has been among the weakest-performing sectors in the Cuban economy for decades, constrained by insufficient incentives and a lack of funding. In recent years, the contributions to the sector have come mostly from non-residential government-funded projects, supported by domestic and external financing. This is particularly common for mid- and large-scale tourist developments and infrastructure works.

Residential construction declined sharply between 2020 to 2024, decreasing 77% and continuing downward into 2025. By July 2025, Cuba had about 4 million homes and a deficit of 805,583, with the most critical situations in:

• Havana
• Holguin
• Santiago de Cuba
• Camagüey

The Cuban government estimates that at least 50,000 new homes must be built each year, a figure that hasn’t been reached since 2007. Between 2020 and 2024, annual housing construction averaged only 19,049 units and continued to decline. Domestic production of construction materials followed a similar pattern, falling by 77% over the same period. Materials once produced locally, such as cement and steel bars, are now largely imported.

While opportunities exist, Cuba is not a suitable market for first-time exporters or companies seeking quick sales. In a context marked by a deep economic crisis, the main challenge for foreign companies is securing payment. The situation is especially problematic in sectors that depend on the government budget, such as:

• healthcare
• education
• utilities
• transportation

The government has also granted limited autonomy to prioritized sectors, allowing them to use a portion of their hard currency revenues to finance essential imports needed to maintain operations.

In 2024, tourism and real estate accounted for 36% of government spending. Utilities represented 12%, and this share is expected to increase in 2025 as the Cuban government accelerates its transition toward renewable energy, particularly photovoltaic projects.

• Havana (59%)
• Santiago de Cuba (8%)
• Camagüey (5%)
• Holguín (4%)
• Pinar del Río (4%)

Bureaucratic procedures, especially approval processes, can be complex, slow and unclear. Access to financing is another major challenge, as Cuba is excluded from most global credit sources. Foreign companies must register as authorized suppliers with a Cuban state-run foreign trade company before exporting to Cuba. This process takes time and requires extensive legal and accounting documentation. Given the ongoing economic crisis, securing payment remains the main concern.

The private sector has become the most dynamic part of the Cuban economy. By the end of 2024, Cuba had 9,236 micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MIPYMEs) and 5,132 cooperatives, compared to 2,692 state-run companies.

In 2025, private-sector imports exceeded USD 2 billion, representing 25% of Cuba’s total imports. While the government remains the main investor in infrastructure, private companies are increasingly involved as subcontractors on publicly funded projects.

Private initiatives are also emerging in infrastructure. For example, companies in Camagüey and Villa Clara have installed significant photovoltaic capacity, and private crews are helping complete work at new tourist facilities.

The growth of private businesses has created both new opportunities and new risks. Private companies have greater flexibility in choosing suppliers, but they often make smaller and more fragmented purchases. As a result, exporters may need to work with a larger number of buyers.

Payment practices also differ. Private companies typically pay through overseas accounts, often partially or fully in advance. However, payments may involve intermediaries or relatives abroad, which can raise transparency and compliance concerns. In contrast, state companies usually rely on letters of credit, which are more secure, but they often request long-term financing of one to two years.

 The private sector cannot import goods directly. Imports must be handled through state-run specialized foreign trade companies, which mainly act as customs agents.

Of the more than 2,500 state-run companies in Cuba, only about 240 are authorized to conduct foreign trade operations. Only around 70 of these are permitted to manage imports on behalf of the private sector.

• China
• Spain
• Vietnam
• France
• Türkiye
• Mexico
• Colombia
• Germany
• the United Kingdom (U.K.)
• India
• Singapore

The United States remains largely absent due to the longstanding embargo.

For more information on infrastructure in Cuba, contact havantd@international.gc.ca.